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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

The resolution of this breach of contract action turns upon the constitutionality of the Idaho
Legislature's attempted retroactive repeal of!. C. § 72-915 for the express purpose of depriving one
of the parties to that contract of its vested rights so that the other party to that contract could be
relieved of its contractual obligations. Two Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a putative class
(collectively referred to as "CDA Dairy Queen"), brought this action. They are seeking to recover
"rate readjustments" (sometimes referred to as dividends) which they were contractually entitled to
receive upon the premiums they paid for workers' compensation insurance policies issued by the
Defendant, Idaho State Insurance Fund, (hereinafter "SIF").
It is alleged that each of the named Plaintiffs and all of the members of the proposed class

are Idaho employers who purchased contracts of workers' compensation insurance with the SIF.
First Amended Complaint ~ 8, R.27. The "Class" includes all subscribers to workers' compensation

insurance policies issued by the SIF (hereinafter "policyholders") who:
1.

Acquired their policy during the class period;

2.

Were billed an annual premium of more than $2,500;

3.

Held their policies for at least six months prior to the effective date ofSB
1166aa; and,

4.

Did not for one or more ofthe relevant periods (one year blocks of time which the
SIF calls "dividend periods") during the "class period," receive at least a pro rata
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share ofthe amount being distributed by the SIF as a rate readjustment.

First Amended Complaint

~

15, R.30-31. The "class period" is defined as "Dividend Periods

beginning on July 1,2002 and including all Dividend Periods ending on or before June 30, 2009."

First Amended Complaint

~

12, R.29.

This action is not a re-litigation of the claims asserted in Farber, et al. v. Idaho State

Insurance Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 208 P.3d 289(2009) (hereinafter Farber). There are many
similarities, but there are also two important distinctions which result in this action involving a new
class and a new and pivotal issue.
First, Farber was initiated, pursued and ultimately resolved solely on behalf of a class
composed of policyholders who were billed, for one or more policy years during the class period,
$2,500 or less in premiums. This delineation was based on the fact that at the time the action was
initiated, the SIF was wrongly treating those policyholders as being ineligible to receive any share
of the rate readjustment. The impropriety of the formula being used as to other policyholders was
not then known to Plaintiffs and their Counsel. I Only policyholders who were billed $2,500 or less
for any given policy year during the class period were included in the Farber class for that policy
year. In contrast, the policyholders who would be included in the CDA Dairy Queen class are those
policyholders who were billed, for one or more policy years during the class period, over $2,500 in

1 In most years at issue in Farber, all of the class members received no rate readjustment. There
were however, a few years in which policyholders who paid $1,500 or more but less than $2,501 received
an amount which was less than a pro rata share of the rate readjustment. There were also two years in
which most policyholders who paid less than $2,501 were eligible to receive a payment which in all cases
was less than a pro rata share of the rate readjustment.
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premiums and they are class members only for those policy years in which they were billed over
$2,500 in premiums. Thus, Farber and this action each pertain to two distinctly different classes.
Second, before CDA Dairy Queen filed this action, the Idaho Legislature in direct and
immediate response to the Farber decision, repealed I.C. § 72-915 and purported to make that repeal

retroactive to January 1,2003. CDA Dairy Queen does not question the Legislature's power to
repeal I.C. § 72-915 prospectively (as to any contract entered into less than six months before the
effective date of the repeal).2 However, the attempt to materially change contracts retroactively, so
as to relieve the SIP of its fixed and determinable obligations under those contracts, gives rise to a
pivotal constitutional challenge which was not before the Farber Court. CDA Dairy Queen contends
that, with respect to contracts which included rights which vested prior to any legislative action, Art.
I § 16 of the Idaho Constitution exists to protect it from legislative action which relieves the SIP of
its obligations by depriving CDA Dairy Queen ofthe opportunity to benefit from those vested rights.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

1.

A Class Action Complaint was filed on December 24, 2009.

2

An Amended Class Action Complaint was filed on June 10,2010, R. 6-40, and it was served
June, 18,2010.

The enactment declared the existence of an emergency. To the extent that this is a supportable
declaration, then the repeal would be effective on May 6, 2009, when it was signed by the Governor.
However, given that the next rate readjustment would not have been considered until December of 2009,
there appears to be no basis in fact or law to support the declaration of an emergency. If that declaration
is invalid, then the repeal would not be effective until July 1,2009. This question was not directly raised
for determination by District Court and it was mooted by the District Court's determination that
retroactive application back to January 1,2003, was constitutionally permissible.
2
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3.

SIP answered on July 1,2010, R. 41-53, and subsequently amended that Answer on July 21,
2010. R. 54- 67.

4.

Pursuant to I.C. § 10-1211, the Attorney General was served and declined to appear.

5.

CDA Dairy Queen filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (including supporting
affidavits and memoranda) on September 23,2010, in which they requested that the District
Court determine that the repeal ofI.C. § 72-915, if applied retroactively, would violate the
protections afforded by Art. I, Section 16, of the Constitution of the State ofIdaho. 3 R. 6870.

6.

SIP filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (including supporting affidavits and
memorandum) on October 26,2010, in which it requested that the District Court determine
that the emergency repeal ofLC. § 72-915, should be applied retroactively to January 1,
2003, and that this application did not violate protections afforded by either the U.S. or the
Idaho Constitutions. R. 207-208.

7.

CDA Dairy Queen filed a Motion to Strike all of the Affidavit of James Alcorn and portions
of the Affidavit of Counsel which were filed by the SIP in support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment. See, Plaintiffs' Motion to Augment The Record, Item 7.

8.

The matter was heard by the Court on December 15,2010.

9.

The District Court did not rule upon Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Affidavits because it
indicated it would not be relying upon any portion of the challenged information. Tr. 5:5 to

3 The record also reflects that CDA Dairy Queen filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment
relative to the Defendants' 14th Affirmative Defense but the documents in the record relative to that
Motion (R. 204 - 206) are irrelevant to this appeal.
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6:15.
10.

The District Court, ruling from the bench, denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in a written order filed
on 12128110. Tr. 105:1 to 119:11.

11.

Judgment against Plaintiffs was entered on 1/4/2011. R. 360-362.

12.

Appellants' Notice of Appeal timely filed on 1127/2011. R. 363-366.

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The SIF was established by the Idaho Legislature in 1917. See, Idaho Code, Title 72,
Chapter 9. For the first 92 years of the SIF's existence, its sole authority to distribute its surplus as
rate readjustments to its policyholders derived from I.C. § 72-915, which read as follows:

72-915. Dividends.·- At the end of every year, and as such other times as the manager
in his discretion may determine, a readjustment of the rate shall be made for each of the
several classes of employments or industries. If at any time there is an aggregate balance
remaining to the credit of any class of employment or industry which the manager deems
may be safely and properly divided, he may in his discretion, credit to each individual
member of such class who shall have been a subscriber to the state insurance fund for a
period of six (6) months or more, prior to the time of such readjustment, such proportion of
such balance as he is properly entitled to, having regard to his prior paid premiums since the
last readjustment of rates (emphasis added).
This Court has confirmed that this statute is incorporated into and becomes a term of the
contracts between the SIF and its policyholders and that it affords the SIF's Manager the discretion
to determine \vhether to declare a rate readjustment and to determine the total amount of the surplus
to be distributed among the SIF's policyholders. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insurance Fund; and
Drew Forney, Manager a/the State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 138; 997 P. 2d 591, 599
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(2000). This Court has also held that this statute clearly and unambiguously requires that the
Manager must distribute the rate readjustment on a pro rata basis among all policyholders who held
their policy for at least six months during the period affected by the rate readjustment, giving
consideration only to billed premiums for the applicable period. Farber, 147 Idaho at 31 0, 208 P.3d
at 292. The decision in Farber did not operate to change the law, to interpret an ambiguity in the
law, or to change the effect previously given to it by any Idaho Appellate Court.
While in the years since 1917 there have been substantial revisions to many of the statutes
pertaining to the SIP, the language ofI.C. § 72-915 has been amended only to change the language
relative to the person charged with discretion over and responsibility for the distribution of any rate
readjustments. Compare, 1917 S.L., Ch. 81, §92, p. 252, with 1939 S.L., Ch. 251, §15, p. 617 and
1941 S.L., Ch. 20, §13, p. 37(see Appendix A). In 1951, the Legislature took away the SIF's ability
to make assessments against policyholders but did not in any way change the language ofLC. § 72915. See, 1951 S.L. Ch. 269, §1, p. 570.

Perhaps the most significant revisions of the law pertaining to the SIF occurred when in1998,
the Idaho Legislature passed House Bill 774. R. 87-100. The Bill, HB 774, was a by-product ofa
special legislative task force that spent a year between the 1997 and 1998 sessions drafting the Bil1.
R.102. That legislation, among other things not remotely relevant to this action, restructured the
management of the SIF (creating a Board of Directors with power to oversee the Manager); clarified
and delineated the respective powers and responsibilities of the Manager and the Board; repealed I.e.
§ 72-911, which had previously included language bearing upon the accumulation ofreserves and
surplus, and provided for the SIF to be deemed, for the purposes of regulation by the Idaho
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Department of Insurance, a mutual insurance company.

It is apparent that the Legislature did

discuss dividends and that the SIP's continued ability to distribute dividends was considered by the
Legislature, e.g. R.1 04, but there was never any indication that the provisions of I.C. § 72-915 were
considered to be inadequate or in need of change. R. 100-161 (Legislative History).
In the decade following the passage ofHB 774 in 1998, the SIF utilized an allocation formula
which had been used for several prior years and which impermissibly failed to make a pro rata
distribution of the rate readjustment funds deemed to be available for allocation. R.172 -174 & 180183. The formula correctly utilized "billed premiums" as a starting point but thereafter completely
departed from the clear and unambiguous requirements of the contract. Billed premiums were
incorrectly reduced for underwriting expenses based upon a percentage of the billed premium which
percentage was decreased as the amount of billed premium increased. The remaining amount was
then, if applicable, further incorrectly reduced by a "loss factor" (1.18 times any losses on the
policy). The remaining amount, if any, was multiplied by a "rate of return" ("return percentage")
which incorrectly increased as the amount of billed premium increased. R. 173 & 175. Initially, this
contractually impermissible formula was used to calculate rate readjustments for all policyholders
regardless of the amount of premium paid. In 2002, the Board decided to pay no rate readjustment
at all to policyholders whose billed premium did not exceed a minimum (initially $2,500 and later
changed to $1,500).
The decision to pay no rate readjustment to policyholders whose premium was $2,500 or less
was addressed by this Court in an initial opinion issued March 5, 2009 and, following a petition for
rehearing, in a replacement opinion issued May 5, 2009. Farber, 147 Idaho 309, 208 P. 3d 293-291.
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In both decisions, the Supreme Court determined that Idaho Code § 72-915, was a material term of
the contract which clearly and unambiguously required that, for any policy period in respect to which
the SIF elected to pay a rate readjustment, the funds available for that readjustment had to be divided
among all time-qualified policyholders (those who held their policy for at least six months) pro rata
based solely upon the amount of the premium which each had been billed. Farber, 147 Idaho 311312,208 P. 3d 293-294.

In the two-month interval between these two Supreme Court decisions, State Senator John
Goedde, a member of the SIF's Board of Directors, presented SB 1166to the Senate Commerce and
Human Resources Committee. The minutes reflect that he testified the Bill would "serve to offset
an adverse decision of the Idaho Supreme Court regarding the interpretation ofIdaho Code, Section
72-915 ... " but that he was not intending to "circumvent the Supreme Court's decision."R.186-188.
Senate Bill 1166, in its original form, acknowledged the Farber decision. It included a
statement purporting to reflect the legislative intention underlying the 1998 amendments to the laws
regulating the SIF which is facially inconsistent with the recorded legislative history ofHB 774. R.
85-161. Relying upon this self-serving revisionist hindsight, the Bill expressed the theory that a
conflict existed in the laws regulating the SIF, and, upon that basis, it provided for a repeal ofIdaho
Code 72-915 retroactive to April, 1998. R. 184. When SB 1166 was presented to the Senate
Commerce and Human Resources Committee on April 7, 2010, testimony from representatives of
the Farber class challenged the Bill on the basis that if applied retroactively it would impair the
obligations and rights of contracts. A majority of the committee members voted to hold the Bill in
Committee.

R. 186-193. On April 14, 2010, the Bill came back before the Committee with
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representations that agreements had been reached to amend the Bill. On that basis SB 1166 was sent
to the Senate Amending Order, R. 194, were it became SB 1166aa. As amended, the Bill provided
for retroactive effect "only" to January 1,2003, and specifically stated that it was not in any way
intended to apply to any claims made in Farber v. State Insurance Fund. SB 1166aa, R. 185, passed
through both the Senate and the House and was signed by the Governor on May 6th , 2009. (SB 1166aa
is attached as Appendix B).
On this record, the District Court determined that SB 1166aa was constitutional and in doing
so made several determinations each of which CDA Dairy Queen contends are contrary to the law
and unsupported by the facts in the record before the District Court. The District Court began by
concluding that it could properly look past established Idaho precedent and rely upon the analytical
calculus utilized by federal courts in deciding if state action violates the Federal "Contracts Clause"
(Art. 1 § 10 ofthe United States Constitution). Tr. 115:12-16 and Tr. 118:21-25.
Utilizing this "federal approach" the District Court addressed three questions. First, the
District Court considered whether any contracts existed that provided for pro rata rate readjustments
(Tr. 116:5-8) and concluded that even if such contracts existed a retroactive application ofthe repeal
would not substantially impair those contracts because there would only be a "minimal effect on
some policyholders" and because the contracts were "primarily set up to provide coverage ... not for
the payment of dividends." Tr.117:21-23. Second, the District Court considered whether there was
a significant and legitimate public purpose underlying a retroactive application of the repeal ofLC.

§ 72-915 and concluded that the Legislature's primary concern was the protection of the State's
economy and that this was a "grave concern." Tr.117:14-28 and 118:12-16. Third, the District Court
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considered whether the means used to protect the economy of the State - i.e. the retroactive repeal
ofLC. §72-915 - was a reasonable means and ofa character appropriate to that end and concluded
that it was. Tr. 117:23-118:2 and 118:12-16.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL

A.

Is a retroactive change imposed by the Idaho Legislature upon a material term of
contracts between, on the one hand, citizens of and businesses in Idaho and, on the
other, an entity created by and overseen by the same Legislature a violation of Art.
I § 16 of the Idaho Constitution, which prohibits state action which impairs the
obligations of contracts?

B.

Does federal decisional law relative to restrictions imposed on impairment of
contracts by state action, as set out in Art. 1 § 10 of the U.S. Constitution provide
a relevant basis upon which a retroactive change imposed by the Idaho Legislature
upon a material term of the contracts at issue in this matter can be rationally found
to be permissible notwithstanding the prohibition against state action which impairs
the obligations of contracts set out in Art. I §16 of the Idaho Constitution?
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III.

ARGUMENT

A.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

As this appeal involves a constitutional challenge to legislative action, the Supreme Court
exercises free review. Credit Bureau ofE. Idaho, Inc. v. Lecheminant, 149 Idaho 468, 469,253 P .3d
1188, 1190 (2010). To the extent that this action requires interpretation of a legislative enactment,
this action presents a question oflaw over which this Supreme Court exercises de novo review. V-J

Oil Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 134 Idaho 716, 718, 9 P.3d 519, 521 (2000).

B.

SUMkURYOFARGUMENT

CDA Dairy Queen contends that to the extent that SB 1166aa operates to retroactively
remove a material term from contracts which were in existence more than six months prior to the
effective date of the Bill, the Bill is an unconstitutional legislative action.

CDA Dairy Queen

acknowledges that legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional, that reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of constitutionality and that the burden of demonstrating that the law
should be declared unconstitutional rests upon that party making that claim. Oneida County Fair

Boardv. Smylie, 86 Idaho 341, 346, 386 P.2d 374, 376 (1963). However, this Court has the power
to declare enactments unconstitutional in clear cases. Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35,40,232 P.3d
813,818 (2010). This is a clear case.
When SB 1166aa is considered in view ofthe prohibition of Art. I § 16, Idaho Constitution
and the consistent application of that prohibition in decisions of this Court, it is apparent that the
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attempt to retroactively repeal I.C. § 72-915 is clearly void because it is unconstitutional. Federal
decisional law, which was relied upon by the District Court, is not relevant because it relies upon an
interpretation of Art. 1 § 10 of the United States Constitution which provides less protection to Idaho
citizens than is provided by Art. I §16, Idaho Constitution. 4

C.

THE RETROACTIVE CHANGE IMPOSED BY THE IDAHO LEGISLATURE UPON
A MATERIAL TERM OF CONTRACTS AT ISSUE CONSTITUTES A CLEAR
VIOLATION OF ART I §16 OF THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION

1.

A contract exists between the parties which includes the requirement that
any rate readjustments be distributed upon a pro rata basis among timequalified policyholders considering only the amount ofpremium paid

The District Court professed uncertainty about whether the contracts between CDA Dairy
Queen and the SIP included a contractual right to share in any rate readjustments on a pro rata basis.
Tr.116:5-8. The facts and the law do not support any such uncertainty.

4 CDA Dairy Queen sees the District Court's foray into federal decisional law as completely
unnecessary because Art. I § 16 as applied by Idaho decisional law clearly prohibits the retroactive
application of SB 1166aa. Until the SIF is able to identifY Idaho case law which provides justification
for this Court to ignore Steward v. Nelson, 54 Idaho 56 at 67,28P.2d 824 at 828 (Idaho, 1933) and
Fidelity State Bank v. North Fork Highway District, 35 Idaho 797, 209 P. 449(1922) and their progeny or
articulates any basis upon which those decisions can be overruled, CDA Dairy Queen sees no point in
detailing and discussing the other numerous defects in the District Court's decision. CDA Dairy Queen
does not intend to waive or to be seen as waiving the right to present these arguments which include in
overview: a) the District Court completely misplaced reliance upon National Railway v. Atchison
Topeka, 470 U.S. 451 (1985); b) the District Court erred in relying upon cases such as RUI One v.
Berkeley, 371 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2004) without recognizing their lack of relevance to the retroactive
changes made by SB 1166aa; c) the District Court made a series of erroneous and unsupported factual
determinations; and, d) the District Court relied upon its own erroneous factual determinations and
unsupported and illogical claims made by the Idaho Legislature to incorrectly conclude that retroactive
application of SB 1166aa was constitutional when evaluated using the analytical approach described in
RUIOne.
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The policies of workers , compensation insurance issued by the SIF to the CDA Dairy Queen
and thousands of other Idaho employers are acknowledged by the SIF to be contracts for the
provision of insurance coverage. See, Paragraph A of the policy, R. 74. At all times during the
class period, the terms and conditions ofthe contracts between the SIF and its policyholders included
not only the provisions of its written policy but also the Idaho statutes creating and governing the SIF
which were in force at the time the contract was entered into. Hayden Lake Fire Protection District
v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 399, 111 P.3d 73, 84 (2005), Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insurance
Fund; and Drew Forney, Manager o/the State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho l30, l38; 997 P. 2d 591,

599 ( 2000), Straus and Nicholson v. Ketchum, 54 Idaho 56 at 67; 28 P.2d 824 at 828 (1933).
Given that Idaho Code § 72-915 was in existence until the (arguably) effective date ofSB
1166aa there is no rational basis upon which the District Court could question the existence of
contracts which included a material term that provided a right to be paid a pro rata share of any
amount which the SIF's Manager determined could be allocated as a rate readjustment. This right
vested as soon as the policyholder held a contract of insurance with the SIF for more than six
months. Moreover, any such uncertainty is fully resolved by this Court's decision in Farber.
See, 147 Idaho at 311, 208 P.3d at 293. In even suggesting that the existence of a right to a pro rata

share of any amount which the Manager of the SIF determined could be allocated as a rate
readjustment was open to question, the District Court was clearly mistaken.
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2.

SB 1166aa vitiates a material term oftens ofthousands ofcontracts and the
change substantially impairs a material vested right under those contracts.

The District Court erroneously concluded both that the right to receive a pro rata share of
any funds distributed as a rate readjustment was not a material term of the contracts for workers'
compensation coverage, Tr. 117:6-9 and that the harm that would be done by retroactively removing
that right from those contracts did not substantially impair the contracts because the damage done
was "minimal." Tr. 117: 10-13 & 21-24. The District Court gave no consideration to the fact that,
as to all contracts formed more than six months before the effective date of the statute, the right to
receive a pro rata share of any funds which the Manager decided to distribute as rate readjustments
was a fully vested right.
The relevant facts and binding Idaho precedent preclude the District Court from determining
that the right to receive a pro rata share of any funds distributed as a rate readjustment is not a
material term of the contract. A rate readjustment as described in I.C. §72-915 is the equivalent of
a refund of a portion of the premium paid to acquire the policy.

The consideration paid for a

contractual benefit has long been acknowledged to be one of the material and necessary elements
of a contract. See., e.g. Vance v. Connell, 96 Idaho 417, 418, 529 P.2d 1289, 1290 (1974). The fact
that workers' compensation insurance policies provide coverage does not diminish in any way the
materiality of the price term of the contract. 5 The District Court cites no authority which suggests
that the price term of a contract or terms which affect the price of a contract can ever be considered

5 One wonders how the SIP would respond to the argument that the policy was not really about
the payment of premiums if it were being made by a person who the SIP had sued to recover the balance
of the premium billed for coverage.
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to be immaterial terms of the contract.
The relevant facts and law also preclude a determination that the damage caused by vitiating
the right to receive a pro rata share of any funds distributed as a rate readjustment is either minimal
or insubstantial. First it should be noted that, as the District Court appears to acknowledge, Idaho
decisions do not turn upon substantiality. Citing from Fidelity State Bank v. North Fork Highway

District, 35 Idaho 797, 209 P. 449 (1922) the District Court indicated that:
Any enactment of a legislative character is said to 'impair' the obligation of a contract which
attempts to take from a party a right to which he is entitled by its terms or which deprives
him of the means of enforcing such right.
Tr. 116:14-18.
Even assuming that substantiality is a proper consideration, the record adequately
demonstrates that the amount at issue is substantial. Senator Goedde, a member of SIP's Board of
Directors, testified in the Senate hearings that the aggregate amount at issue was in the range of$24
million dollars. R. 188. The record in this case does not permit a demonstration of how the SIF
determined this number but it is plainly a substantial amount.
The record in this case does permit calculations which independently demonstrate
substantiality. Utilizing the information which is fully available in the record, for those policies
issued in a three year period beginning on or after July 1,2004 and before June 31,2007, the average
percentage of the premium refundable in a pro rata allocation of the amount distributed as a rate
readjustment is 7.6%. R. 259. In spite ofthis evidence, the District Court gave no consideration to
the determination of the Court of Appeals that a contract price adjustment of 5% could not be
considered to be insubstantial. City ofHayden, v. Washington Water Power Co., 108 Idaho 467,
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468, 700 P.2d 89, 90 (Ct App. 1985).
Even if the average rate of readjustment were not on its face sufficient to establish
substantiality, it is apparent that individual damages are also substantial. Applying the average rate
readjustment rate of7.6% to the known premiums billed to Discovery Care Centre LLC of Salmon
(the second named Plaintiff, hereinafter "Discovery Care") for policies for the three years on which
the percentage is based (1/1/2005, 1/1/2006 and 1/1/2007 --$238,818.00, R.356)it becomes apparent
that if retroactive repeal of I.C. § 72-915 is permitted Discovery Care (which received no rate
readjustment in any ofthese years) will be deprived of about $18,000 which it was entitled to receive
under the contracts it had with the SIF. This amount is on its face substantial.

3.

Based upon long-standing Idaho Law, to the extent it is given retroactive
application, SB 1166aa violates the protections afforded to Idaho citizens
and business by Art. I § 16 ofthe Idaho Constitution.

Numerous Idaho decisions have held that the State Legislature may not change material terms
of contracts which were in existence prior to the effective date of an enactment seeking to
accomplish such a change. There have been no exceptions to this absolutist approach with respect
to contracts among citizens and between citizens and governmental or quasi -governmental entities.
In 1922, this Court decided Fidelity State Bank v. North Fork Highway District, 35 Idaho
797,209 P. 449 (1922). In that case, a change in a state statute which the Legislature had intended
to be applied retroactively would have caused funds which were deposited into a bank by the North
Fork Highway District to have been re-characterized from funds held in trust to funds held as general
deposits. Ifapplied retroactively, this statute would have favored the general depositors of the bank
Appellants' Brief
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which, in the bank's liquidation, had a right inferior to any funds held in trust. In discussing the
applicable law this Court stated:
A law enacted subsequent to a contract which, if valid, will have the effect of annulling the
contract constitutes the most palpable form oflegislative impairment, and such an enactment
is clearly unconstitutional... Legislation that attempts to make material alterations in the
character, terms, or legal effect of existing contracts is clearly void. Of this character are
statutes which attempt to add a material condition or provision to a contract, and those which
attempt to release material stipulations contained therein. (citations omitted, emphasis
added).

Id., 35 Idaho 810,209 P. 452. Ultimately this Court held:
It is a well-known fundamental rule oflaw that a state by the act of its legislature cannot alter
the nature or legal effect of an existing contract to the prejudice of either party, nor can the
legislature make a law for a particular case between two contracting parties contrary to the
existing law and require the courts to enforce it. This rule is founded on two distinct
principles of constitutional law, one prohibiting the assumption of judicial power by the
legislative department, and the other inhibiting the impairment by a state of the obligation
of contracts. The obligation of a contract is impaired by a statute which alters its terms, by
imposing new conditions or dispensing with conditions, or which adds new duties or releases
or lessens any part of the contract obligation or substantially defeats its ends. It is not only
private contracts that are protected from impairment by state law. The protection also extends
to contracts made by a state or a municipal corporation. (emphasis added)

Id., 35 Idaho at 813, 209 P. at 453. This holding has remained unquestioned for the last 89 years.
In 1954, this Court decided Penrose v. Commercial Traveler's Insurance Co., 75 Idaho 524,
275 P .2d 969 (1954). In that case, a change in state law which occurred after a contract of insurance
had been issued to Penrose by Commercial Traveler's Insurance provided for an award of attorney
fees if an insured successfully sued his insurance company for failing to pay an amount justly due
on a claim. The resolution of the case required the Court to address two questions. The first
question - was there coverage? - was resolved by a majority of the Court in the lead opinion in favor
of coverage. The second question - did retroactive imposition ofthe statute providing for an award
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of attorney's fees onto a pre-existing contract amount to an impennissible "impainnent of the
obligations of contracts?" - was resolved by a three justice majority which held that the statute, as
applied to contracts in existence at the time it was passed, impennissibly impaired the contract. 6
In 1993, this Court decided Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598,850 P.2d 749 (1993). In that case
this Court considered whether a statute which limited the rights of a trust deed beneficiary to initiate
judicial action to collect upon the underlying note could be applied to notes and deeds of trust which
were executed prior to the effective date of the statute and at a time when the beneficiaries' rights
were broader. In reaching its decision, the Court expressly rejected language from an earlier Court
of Appeals case which suggested that the applicability of the limitations imposed by the statute
would turn not on the date ofthe contract vis-a-vis the effective date of the statute but rather upon
the date the action was filed. In reaching its conclusion, the Court quoted favorably from Steward
v. Nelson, 54 Idaho 437, 32 P.2d 843 (1934) in which the Court held that the law existing when a
mortgage is made enters into and becomes a part of the contract, and any change in the law which
operates to deny or to obstruct any rights accruing under the contract as fonned (including statutes
then in effect) is a violation of Idaho's constitutional provision prohibiting any laws which impair

6The tension between "change of contract" and "change of remedy" which is evident in the
conflicting opinions in Penrose has continued to be present through a line of cases related to whether
statutes imposing attorney fee awards can be applied to contracts in existence at the time that the statute
is passed. The rule derived from this line of cases remains consistent with Penrose to the extent that if
the change brought about by the statute affects the rights of only one party to the contract it is seen as
materially and impermissibly changing the contract by changing the balance of power inherent in the
contract. Where the rights of both parties are affected equally by the attorney fee statute then the change
is not considered to be material and, consistent with "change of remedy" analysis, the only question
considered relevant to "retroactive" application is whether the action was filed before the statute became
effective. See, e.g. Myers v Vermas, 114 Idaho 85, 87-88, 753 P.2d 296,298-99 (Ct. App 1998), Ericson
v. Blue Cross Health Servs., 116 Idaho 693, 695-696, 778 P.2d 815,817-818 (1989), Bott v.Idaho State
Bldg. Authority, 122 Idaho 471, 480-481,835 P.2d 1282, 1291-1292 (1996).
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the obligations of contract. Id., 54 Idaho at 441 & 444, 32 P.2d at 845 & 846. Consistent with
Steward v. Nelson, the Court held that the change in the statute could not be applied to limit the

rights in place at the time that contract was executed. Curtis, 123 Idaho at 610,850 P.2d at 761.
Applying this long-standing and consistently utilized analysis, it is apparent that the
retroactive application ofSB 1166aa, is contrary to the protection afforded to CDA Dairy Queen by
Art. I § 16 ofthe Idaho Constitution. It impermissibly works to change the contract by relieving the
SIF ofthe obligation to pay refunds of premiums paid to it by the policyholders. Because it changes
the rights of the plaintiffs and the duties of the SIF, the change materially impairs the contracts
between the SIF and its policyholders and is, in the words of this Court in Fidelity, "clearly void."

D.

FEDERAL DECISIONAL LAW IS COMPLETELY IRRELEVANT TO THE
RESOLUTION OF THIS MATTER.

1.

Idaho's decisional law has properly imposed a broadly preclusive reading
ofArt. 1 § 16 ofthe Idaho Constitution, which affords greater protection to
contractsformed in Idaho than is afforded to the same contracts by Art. 1 §
10 ofthe United States Constitution, as interpreted byfederal decisional law.

Initially both state and federal constitutional provisions were seen by this Court to absolutely
prohibit any legislative action which impaired a contract by destroying the contract or abolishing any
of the obligations of the contract. In 1934, the Idaho Supreme Court observed:
Under the federal and state constitutional provisions above quoted, no law can ever be passed
impairing the obligations of a contract, and no exception is made, consequently the contracts
of a drainage district stand upon the same footing as those of individuals or any other agency.
The legislature cannot, under such constitutional prohibitions, authorize under the police
power of the state the creation of a contracting agency and permit the contracting of
obligations, and by the same power destroy its contracts and abolish its obligations. To
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permit the legislature to do so would destroy the very essence of the constitutional
prohibitions. Clearly such was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution. Were
it otherwise no person would ever be safe to enter into a contract with public or quasi-public
corporations, creatures of the law.

Straus and Nicholson v. Ketchum, 54 Idaho 56, 83,28 P.2d 824,834 (Idaho, 1933). This reading
of the Idaho Constitution is completely consistent with the earlier pronouncement that legislative
actions which impair contracts are "clearly void." Fidelity, supra.
By 1954, when Penrose was decided, it was apparent to this Court that the federal decisional
law relative to state action which impaired contracts was evolving in a manner consistent with
jurisprudence which allows for a police power right of state and federal governments to, in the right

circumstances, trump federal constitutional protections.

The difference between this federal

approach and Idaho decisions treating Art. I § 16 as an absolute prohibition against the impairment
of contracts by state action is well demonstrated by the decision in United States for the Benefit of

Midwest Steel and Iron Works v. Henly, 117 F. Supp. 928 (D.C. Idaho, 1954). In that case, several
months prior to the decision in Penrose, the U.S. District Court for the District ofIdaho, applying
federal decisional law, determined that the same attorney fees statute which was found by our Idaho
Supreme Court, in Penrose, to be a violation ofthe Idaho Constitution, was not a violation of the
Art. 1 § 10 of the United States Constitution. With full knowledge ofthe decision in United States

for the Benefit ofMidwest Steel and Iron Works v. Henly, this Court nevertheless found in Penrose
that the statute in question violated the Idaho prohibition against impairment of contracts. Since

Penrose was decided this Court has never signaled the intention to adopt or to move toward the
approach adopted by the federal courts relative to the application of Art. 1 § 10 of the United States
Constitution.
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The approach taken by this Court in Penrose and subsequent decisions is supported by the
difference in the language of the two constitutional provisions. With respect to restrictions upon the
impairment of contracts, the United States Constitution provides: "Art. 1 § 10. No State shall ...
pass any ... law impairing the obligation of contracts ... " In Article I of the Idaho Constitution,
"Declaration ofRights [of citizens ]," the prohibition against legislation impairing contracts provides:
Art. I § 16 - Bill of attainder, etc., prohibited - No ... law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall ever be passed. 7
While both provisions have facially preclusive language, it is reasonable based upon both language
and context to read Idaho's language as intended to provide the contracts formed by Idaho citizens
with absolute protection.
The drafters of the United States Constitution were balancing federal power (including
protection of the citizens) against the rights of the states to operate within their own borders. These
considerations might be seen as a basis for reading into "any law" the conditioning language "not
based upon a valid exercise of the State's legitimate police power." Certainly, this approach has
been taken in federal decisions interpreting the breadth of the protections afforded to individual
citizens by the federal constitution as balanced against the state police power.
Conversely, the drafters of the Idaho Constitution were themselves citizens seeking to form
a government that was not unduly powerful. They set about doing this in Article I which established
the rights reserved to the citizens and thereby limits the power of the State government over Idaho

The word "ever" is in the context used commonly defined as:
2.
a : at any time <more than ever before>
b : in any way <how can I ever thank you>
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ever.
7
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citizens. Moreover, the drafters of the Idaho Constitution had the benefit of the language of the
United States Constitution which, in some instances, they freely used verbatim. (e.g. Compare the
4th

Amendment, United States Constitution with Art. I § 17, Idaho Constitution). In drafting the

prohibition against the legislative impairment of the obligations of contracts, the Idaho drafters
eschewed relevant language of the United States Constitution and crafted instead a provision which
prevents the legislature from "ever" passing a statute which impairs contracts. Had the drafters
considered the federal constitutional protection to be sufficient this change would not have been
necessary. Under these circumstances it makes perfect sense that the Idaho Appellate Courts have
long read no exceptions into the word "ever."
The decisional law relative to the restriction against the impairment of contracts stated in the
United States Constitution has been interpreted by federal courts to provide conditional protection
to the contracts of state citizens. Conversely, the decisional law ofIdaho relative to Art. I § 16 of
the Idaho Constitution has consistently been read as rendering void any state action impairing
contractual obligations between Idaho citizens and businesses. The wording of the respective
provisions and the context in which they were adopted support these distinctly different approaches.
Thus, while the language of the United States Constitution has been interpreted to leave open the
possibility of exceptions, the language of the Idaho Constitution has been and should be seen as
providing greater protection to Idaho citizens.

"Ever," one must think, means never, not

"sometimes" or "on occasion" or "when the SIP is out of sorts with a decision of this Court."
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2.

Where a provision of the Idaho Constitution affords greater protection to
Idaho citizens than is afforded by a like provision in the Federal
Constitution, Idaho Courts should not rely upon federal decisional law to
determine the rights afforded to Idaho citizens by the Idaho Constitution.

This Court has observed that because:
... federal and state constitutions derive their power from independent sources ... , state
courts are at liberty to find within the provisions of their own constitutions greater protection
than is afforded under the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court. This is true even when the constitutional provisions implicated contain similar
phraseology. Long gone are the days when state courts will blindly apply United States
Supreme Court interpretation and methodology when in the process of interpreting their own
constitutions. (citations omitted.)

State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 10 n.6; 696 P.2d 856, 861 (1985).
This observation was repeated by this Court in State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 ; 842 P .2d 660
(1992) in which this Court declined to adopt the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule,
which had been formulated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897,104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). This Court perceived thatthe decision in Leon derived
from the fact that the federal courts had for some time been developing a narrowing view of the
justifications for and benefits of the exclusionary rule. This Court concluded that the by-product of
this narrowing process was not consistent with the broader reasons which motivated Idaho to adopt
the exclusionary rule in the first instance. Guzman, 122 Idaho at 992-993, 842 P.2d at 671-672.
Because Idaho had adopted an exclusionary rule which caused the Idaho Constitution to afford its
citizens with more protection than was apparently conferred upon them by the United States
Constitution, this Court rejected the "good faith exception" which was a by-product of evolving
federal decisional law.
There are then, in this case, three primary reasons why it is appropriate to determine that
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federal decisional law cannot be relied upon for the purpose of determining ifthe state action at issue
in this case violates the protections afforded by Art. I § 16 of the Idaho Constitution. First, it is clear
that, on its face, Art. I § 16 is more restrictive than the different language employed in United States
Constitution's "contracts clause." Second, there is every reason to believe that in the circumstances
that confronted the drafters of each constitution, the Idaho drafters had greater motivation to limit
the State's rights and, thus, to impose an absolute prohibition and opposed any lesser barrier which
could accommodate some state interference with existing contracts. Third, the decisional law of
Idaho has, in full recognition of the different path being followed by federal courts, consistently
treated the restriction against contractual impairment as absolute with respect to contracts among
citizens and between citizens and governmental or quasi-governmental entities.
These three factors individually and in conjunction with each other compel the conclusion
that federal decisional law is irrelevant to the resolution ofthe issues presented by this case.

IV.

CONCLUSION

F or the forgoing reasons it is respectfully requested that the Court determine that the District
Court erred in granting summary judgment to the SIF and in denying partial summary judgment to
CDA Dairy Queen. For these reasons it is submitted that the Court should remand the matter with
to the District Court for entry of Partial Summary Judgment in favor of CDA Dairy Queen on the
basis that SB 1166aa is unconstitutional to the extent that it seeks to repeal I.e. § 72-915
retroactively.
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IDAHO S:E;SSION LAWS

ited and paid as are other claims against the State of Idaho,
and when all actual and necessary expenses incurred in connection with any application for such loan, or for an extension,
renewal or increase of such loans shall have been paid, ,the
balance, if any, of the dt1Posit made by the applicant over and
above the sum total of said expenses shall be repaid said
applicant from the said "Loan Expense Fund" upon a claim
audited and paid as. are other claims. against the State of
Idaho, and such repayment shall be made whether the loan, or
extension, renewal or increase of loan be or be not made.
, S:E;c. 4. All moneys paid into the said "Loan Expense
Fund" are hereby appropriated and set aside to be expended
for the uses and purposes authorized by this Act.
S:E;c. 5. Any person violating any of the provisions of this
Act, shall upon conviction be punished by a fine not exceeding
one thousand dollars or imprisonmenHn the county jail not
exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprisonm:ent.
S:E;c. 6. All acts or parts of acts in conflict herewith are
hereby repealed.
. SEC. 7. An emergency existing therefor, this Act shall be
in· force and effect from and after its passage and approval.
Appr~ved March 20, 1917.
OHAP~[,ER 81..
(S. B. No: 221.)

AN ACT
TO BE CITED AS THE "WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT,"
. PROVIDING FOR COMPENSATION TO EMPLOYEES FOR
PERSONAL INJURIES SUSTAINED IN THE COURSE OF
· PUBLIC AND INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT AND TO
THEIR DEPENDENTS IN CASE OF DEATH FROM SUCH
INJURIES: PRESCRIBING THE EMPLOYMENTS COVERED
:,BY THIS ACT: MAKING THE PROVISIONS HEREOF AP· PLICABLE TO EMPLOYEES OF THE STATE. AND ALL
COUNTIES, . CITIES, CITIES UNDER SPECIAL CHARTER
• AND COMMISSION FORM OF GOVERNMENT, VILLAGES,
SCHOOL DISTRICTS, IRRIGATION DISTRICTS, DRAINAGE
DISTRICTS, HIGHWAY DISTRICTS. ROAD DISTRICTS
AND OTliER PUBLIC AND MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
PROVIDING THE PROCEDURE IN OBTAINING COMPENSATION HEREUNDER: THE AMOUNT OF SUCH COMPENSATION; THE MANNER OF COMPUTING THE SAME;
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THE PERSONS TO WHOM PAYABLE; THE TIME AND
MANNER OF THE PAYMENT THEREOF AND THE MANNER OF SECURING THE PAYMENT THEREOF; PRO'. VIDING SPECIFIC ENDEMNITIES FOR CERTAIN INJURIES;
DECLARING THE POLICE POWER OF,THE STATE IN THE
PREMISES: MAKING SPECIAL PROVISIONS REGARDING
MEDICAL ATTENDANCE, HOSPITAL CONTRACTS AND
SUBSTiTUTED SYSTEMS OF COMPENSATION, . PAYMENTS
TO ALIENS AND PAYMENTS TO THE STATE IN THE
EVENT OF THE DEATH OF AN INJURED EMPLOYEE
LEAVING NO DEPENDENTS; CREATING AN INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT BOARD OF THREE MEMBERS; PROVIDING FOR
THEIR APPOINTMENT; PRESCRIBING THEIR DUTIES
AND POWERS; FIXING AND MAKING PROVISION FOR
THE PAYMENT OF THEIR SALARIES AND EXPENSES:
PROVIDING THE METHOD OF FIXING COMPENSATION BY
AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES AND BY ARBITRATION;
PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURE BEFORE ARBITRATORS
.AND BEFORE THE BOARD IN MATTERS ARISING UNDER
THIS ACT; PROVIDING FOR THE ENlfORCEMENT OF
AWARDS AND FOR APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE
BOARD ON QUESTIONS OF LAW; PRESCRIBING THE
DUTIES, RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF EMPLOYERS,
EMPLOYEES AND SURETIES HEREUNDER; REGULATING
THE CONTRACTS SECURING COMPENSATION HEREUNDER; CREATING A STATE INSURANCE FUND TO BE
ADMINISTERED BY THE STATE BUT WITHOUT LIABILITY ON THE PART OF THE STATE BEYOND THE AMOUNT
OF SUCH FUND, FOR THE PURPOSE OF INSURING EMPLOYERS AGAINST LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT; PROVIDING
FOR THE COLLECTION, ADMINISTRATION, DISBURSEMENT AND INVESTMENT OF SUCH FUND; PROVIDING
FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A STATE INSURANCE MANAGER; PRESCRIBING HIS COMPENSATION, POWERS AND
DUTIES; PROVIDING FOR THE EMPLOYMENT BY HIM OF
ASSISTANTS; PRESCRIBING THE DUTIES OF THE STATE
TREASURER, STATE AUDITOR. AND BOARD OF EXAMINERS WITH RESPECT TO SUCH FUND; PROVIDING FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF INSURANCE POLICIES AND THE COLLECTION OF PREMIUMS THEREFOR, AND MAKING GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION BY THE
, STATE INSURANCE MANAGER OF A PUBLIC MUTUAL INSURANCECARRIER; PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR EMPLOYERS IN DEFAULT FOR THEP A YMENT OF PREMIUMS, FOR FALSIFICATION OF PAY-ROLLS AND WILFUL
MISREPRESENTATION; ALSO PRESCRIBING A PENALTY
FOR THE DISCLOSURE BY THE STATE INSURANCE MANAGER AND HIS ASSISTANTS OF INFORMATION NOT
OPEN TO PUBLIC INSPECTION;· PROVIDING ~OR THE
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:rvl~'l1;'g:er, with the consent

State in.surance (ulld and the dis\)uJ'sc}Jlcnt$ on ;)C(I)\.llll (If injl1l'ies and deaths of employees ill each of said l'l;.ISSC;;. inclmling the setting lip of rescr\,e,; adequale to l1I.l!ct al1licipated
and unexpected losses and to carry the claims to manu-ity; and
also an account of the money recei ved from each i nd i vid ua!
employer; and of the amount- disbursed from the State Insurance Fund for expenses. and on accOllnt of injuries ;lnd death
of the employees of such cmployer. including' the reserves so

of the Slate Audi-

tor. may sen any (If sl1ch securities, the prucceds thereof to
lie paid over to the Slarc Treasurer for said State Illsurance

F llnd.
/Jdlllim'slrnliu)! HxpclIses.

The entire expense of administering the State
1 nSl1r;l.llce Fund shall I;e paid in the first instance by the State,
mlt of nloneys appn.lpriated therefor. In the month of July,
NilHeen I-hmdred Eig-hteen, and semi-annually thereafter in
slIcll month, the State Insurance 11anager shall ascertain the
just alllount of expel1se incurred
him during the preceding
calendar year, in the administration of the State Insurance
Fund, includlng expense incurred for the examination, deterllliJlatiun, and payment of losses and claims, and shall refund
;nch amount to the Stnle Treasury.
::;>1:''':. 89.
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92. At the end of every

year.

and

at

such other

times

as the State Insurance MaJ1:1ger -in I~is discretion lnay determine, a readjustment of the rate shall be made for each of the
sever;!.1 classes of employments or industries. If at ally time
there is all aggregate l.laiance relll.aining to the Cl'cdil (If all)'
c1nss of employment or industry which the State 1nsJ1rapce
Manager deems may be safely and l)roperly divided. he \llay
in his tliscretion credit to (';1,h individual member of such class
who shall ha\'e been ;1 subscriber to the State Insurance Fund
for a period of six mon\ hs or more, prior to the lime of such
re.adj ustment. sllch proJ1llrt ion of such balance as he is properly entitled to, haviJlg: regard to his prior paid premillms

ClaSSification of Risks and Adjustment of Prc/lI·iums.

90. Employments insured in the State Insurance Fund
hall be divided by the State Insurance Manager, for the pur'ost's of the said fllnd. into classes. Separate accounts shall
e kC'pt of the amOIlIl\S collected and expended in respect to
:tcll sJleh class for convenience in determining equitable
lte:,; but for the jlmpose of paying compensation the State
lS\lI';}JlCe fund shall be deemed one and indivisible. The State
ISllr:1J1ce Manager shall have power to rearrange any of the
asses by withdrawing any employment embraced ·in it and
ansferring it wholly or in part to any other class, and from
eh employments to set up new classes in his direction. The
ate Insurance Manager shall determine the haz:1rcls of the
fferl?lIt classes and fix the rates of premiums therefor based
on the total p::tyroll ;"mcl number of employees in each of
:11 (\:tsses of ell1ployment at the lowest possible rate con~
tent with the maintenance of a solvent State Insurance
nd :lllcl the creation ,A a reasollable surplus amI reserve;
I for stich purpose may adopt .a system of schedule rating
such :1 manner as to take account of the peculiar hazard
each individual risk.

Diddcllds.

SEC.

SEC.

sillce (he !:1st readjustment of rates.

A sscsSlI"lclIls.

-<;"-

SI~C. 93. 1£ the premi\1l115 fixed for all)' class :-tJ1d collected
fn:lJll its members are subsequently found by the State Insurance r.-lanager to have been too small {or any period, he may
determine what additional premiums ,Ire required from said
c\as:; for sait! period, ;1nd may make :lssesSllIents accurdingly,
and each of the members of slIch c1:lss sh::tll be kl1Jle to the
said :M nnager to pay such ;lsseSSl11ent su made UpOIl hil1l within
thirty days after notice thereof.
Readjustlllt'lIl of [>ayro/ls.
St.:c. ~)-I. If the amllllllt IIi pr~·t1liul11 t.:OllecteJ (rol11 any
employer at tile l)eginniJlg \,Ii ally pcrilld i:; ascertained by using
the estilll;lled expenditllre oi wages f .... r the period of time
(overed by such preJ\liuJ\l payment ;IS a lJa~i:;. an adjuslll1ent of
the al\ll'.I\llIl of sllch prcJllillHl shall be lI1;t<le at the end of such
period awl the aetJla] :11111)UJll of :;\1(11 pn:llIillln'i-i\t;tll Ill:: ddcr-

Accounts.
;l~C.

91. 'l:he State I nsl1rance Manager shall' keep an 'atnt of the money pilid in premiums hy e::tch of the several
S('$ of employmenls, and the expense of :1dll1inistering- the

...
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C. :2(lO ':19

. c. SI<.;\:,\L LAMJ'f1, Whenever a motol' \'ehicle i;:; equipped
with
signal hllll!> to cOl11ply with the provisions of Section
.:J:':-:j17, tl1(O signal lamp shall be so ('ol1structed al1(\ 10c:.atE.'d
on the \'<.~hi('le as lO give a signal :rellol\' or red in color, which
shall b(·! plainly visible in normal sunlight, from a distance:
of l()~ I't'€1. to the, l'e,1I: of the vehicle but shall not project.
a glaring 01' claz.z.llIlg light and shall lH:~ or a t~rpe approved
by t.he eOlllmissionel·.

,I

SPJ';CIAJ.. HE:-iTHWTIONS ON LAMl'~. 1. Any
* Zif/lzted'
o( ill'/l,/IIill(/.1 iU{f del,ice npun C/. 1II11/f1r I'ehir:/.I~ ot.her than.
heu:'] lamps, spot Ic~mps, or auxiliary driving lumps which:
pro,}eeLs H beam or light of an intensity greater than * SOU'
candlepowE'1' shall be so directed that no jjart of the beam wil I .
st.rike the leveJ of the " roa(].way on which the vehicle stands·
at a distance of' more than " 75 feet fro111 the vehicle.
":2. Nt) per,wl/. ,~h((.l/. citil.le ur mOL'e all!l /!ehicle VI' elluip'lnent
'/I po'/'/. (( 1/ II Ii iuh:wQII u'i{h an'll la,mp vr del'ice thereon (lisplauing
((. 'red li!/hl /.isa)!.e from directly in frull'! thereof. 1'his section
slza.ll not ClJlpl'{f 10 a.ulhurized emergency I:ehicles.
":J. Fla.shing liuhls an~ prvh£bit.ecZ 0 IJ. molor I'eldcles, eJ:cepl. a.s
a 'means (({ intiicolina h riUhl or left turn.

"d.

lo,/Ilj)

"e.

1. No
(}7(.l!,.id.e uI

Tm.:cl';s TO CARRY li'LARES OR SIMILAR DEVICES.

peFSUU

I:i/tall

opera/i! aliV

uwto?" truck

'1(1)011 (I, highwa.u
(U( {J I iwe /1'011/. a

/Jlwi IIc~,,;.) or residc~I/.('(' dislr/c:l at
hall huur
:;II./I.~I'/. 10 a '/(If:( Iluwr liefure s'llIIri.w unless thefe shalf. /)e
cal'l'il,d ill s'/((:h I:ehicll' (( l:m.jficien,1 Illwl.bur of jla.rr:..':i, IIU/. less
(!.

((If.C!1'

Ihew 1111'1'1', Ut deei'rie tllnl.(!rns or olher 8il/1/.cd8 capal)le of CO1/.li'l/.uU'llrt~/!I IJI"(J(Zncinli three warnina ligh.ls ('((,ell. I'isible froll/ n. dislall.(:(' 1(1' Cli [{'((st :;00 fed, jor a period of (//. le(/$l 8 /lUvrs, II.rcep/.
Iha.t (I, '/i/()Iflr I'ehic/.e Iro.lI';l}Jorting £nJ{a./iI/i/.a.ules mall /'(/.1111 reel
fejlectols i/l j)lllCI' (d /he ()ther siynals al}(II'I' melli/Oiled,
I I b..'I:enl such ./1(l.1'e, l(( IIlau, sional, ur re.l( ee/()}' sha.1l !)(~ ()f ~I t1!1Jt!
a.P1JT()(:eti "II IIU! C()IIIJlli.'lNioller a.nd he l:ihall pu.blish IlSt8 II.! .lhu~(!
dcw/c'l':'; 'II'h lelt he hC/.,~ ((.JI jl/'(}11eil as arielj7f.ole for jJnl'1l(});I'S oj IlllS
Mwlio//.
.
'il, WI/I'III'N!J' Ill/II IIIlIlor Irnck 8"0.11 ii/liP llpUIi (/ hiyhw(7.U

till' wriuc/
till/I' In/11m. t.£uhleil 1.(/ 1/l1)'~ illilsi lie rti"llla.wd
nn Ilinior /'(.>ltir/.c J .';, /1'11.1'1'1' SUI'1t I ru.ck iN /iI/I II)' ('(I.II lIul lie sill II lJi'lt
IIi' 'jJa.rkl'tl 1/./1' I.lie /)(f.I'NI, flilc,r/ ()r lIIoil/ Irc/felied jlorlJulI
Il!.e
hill/urall, f(:lil'lheJ' disaiJled II}' /l.fll, the rlri/'C'/' 01' ullwr !lI'r.'wli I.n
charl/e
XII(," 1'('Mdt' ,~h(J.ll pla.ce or 1.'1I.1I.~c' III II(' pl(l.('erl, .~/(t:h

(lJ

ilnrin!l

iiI

oJ

(I/her li!(li.II't/ 8iY'JI.a.ll:i III Ill' liyhit'd (/1/(1 1J/.(J(,I!tl
11./ (£ tlis/l/.I/.c:e IIf ,I:j II(/(,("~ Ilf (tPfJfll.l:i/l/lIll'ly
toO /('('1 iI/ (f,c/rtll/('(' uJ sUI·II 1'1'1i.it:iI', ()II(~ lit II dhllllln' uf :I:j /IIII'{'.,
u}' (l.jlllreJ.!'il//ull,11I 11I1I/c'C'1 {II Ihl' flfor c~l""lIid I:c,hidc', (/ilililic' Ihird
IIj)(/II. (II(/(II/'II/! :,ie/I' IIf 1"1' I'I''';C-{I', I'.re'('/II IIi((1 1/ IiiI' !'I'Ii;rtl' i,~

.f/u.tC!,'!, 1([//11'(//:;
11/IlJ'/l. IIIC'

or

hillll/('(/.!!,

I/f/e'

C. :! ,:Ji

':\ ~

II lid I !.! SI':SSlU},; LA "'S

Ijl:

1(I(l/ 8 1111 1'Iin(./ ill.l!Clillllltllll"$, IIJrl'l! I'c!d r{'/ll'r/or::; /111.1/1 Iii' 811 Ii/urn!
i/l hl'iI
::;ucli IIlher ;;i!lllals (11/(/ //0 J.)11c:1I jla.lIIl· III' !lIIl'llillfl JIM,
,"lilllll",' j.llrrcl'd adj(u·ell.! Iu 1111(1 "'If·1t ler»' 1I1c!IIIJulIl'll l'l'liid.".

(lJ

";1. ;\'0 PC'1'80/1 sjntll Cl.l rulll lil/ll~ uperclll! CI 1111111/1' I(/lrk /rOIl8pUflill!! I'.fplusires ia; ({ t'l'1I'!!U III' /Jllrt. III (/ I'I'U'IIII 111'11" II hi!lll/I'(I!I
/(lIlc'88 il carries .flut/,oS or I'll'cll'il' 1({lIlerllti (/.S her"i" rl'cillireci, 1II11
.'lIl'h .flllrl's III' ('l('elric l;1l1l1p.1'1!.';; I/lusl I)(~ ('(/'i'(//Jlu
j/f'l/(IIII·i".I! (/ rc.,d
lillM (file! sIll'll/. be c!u;;pl(/!le(/ 1/11U1i IiiI' rocu[zclI{( 1/'1/1'/1 11/111 (Is
o:I}lIio·d ill this o('l'liU/I."

/lJ

Approved Murch II, l!J:3!J,

CHAPTER 251
(H. B. Nil. 178)

AN ACT
.H1ENDING SECTIONS 4:3-1701. ,n-t70Z, 4:3-170:3 • .J:~-li04, ANn
.1:)-1705, IDAHO COTH: ANNOTATED: RI'~PE,\LlNG SECTION 43-J70(), lI)AHO CODE ANNOTArrED; AMENDING
SECTIONS 4:H707, 4:1-1708, .1:)-1709, 4:j·J710, '1:1-lill, 4:1-J71~,
~:J-l'iJ:l, 4:3-171,1, ~:3-liJ5, 4:l-liI6, -<la-J7l7, '1:1-171~. ~:1-1'i19,
~:J·1720, 4:)-1721, ~;j-1722, 4::J-17:!:!, 4:3-1725, -1:.J-1721i AND 4:1-li2'i.
IJ)AHO CODE ANNOTATF~D, HELATING TO THI~ STATE
INSURANCE FUND; CH8ATING THE COMJ'I';i\SATION IN!:lliHANCE CUIVI1VllSSWN, CUNSISTING UP FIVI'; MEI'I'IIlEHS, TO ADMINISTER TI11-: STATE INSllIU\NCr~ FUND:
PIWVIDING FOR THE APPOJNTMENT ANI) URGANIZATlON OF SUCH COMMISSION: FIXING TilE ()UALlFICATTUNS AND CUlVll'ENSATION OF THE MEMBERS THI~HE
OF AND pi\ESCRrnrNG ITS POWERS AN J) DUTIES; PHOVIDING FOn. THE MI!:THOJ) OF MAKING PAYMENTS OF
WORKMEN'S COMPI;;NSATlON INSURANCE: LOSSES AND
PHEMIUM IU~Fl.lNI:lS: PIWVIDING FOR INVEST1\1E:Nl' OF
SUHPLUS 01{ RI~SI::nVF~ OF Tl-m STATE INSI.lHANCE FUND
TO BE MADF; Ill' 'I'HE IJI~PAIlTMENT ()to' PUBLIC IN.
n:STME:NTS AT Till;; IlIl{ECTJON OF SUCJI COiVIMISSlON;
PI{()VIDING FOI{ CANCI~LLA'I'rON OF ANY POLlCY OF
\\'()I{KM8N'S C01VII'I';NSATlllN INSURANCE liNIH~n CON·
IJI'I'IUNS WI'I!';IU': TlfIo~ I~MI'LOYEH 'rS IN IJEI~AlJLT. AND
SU IlSTITUTING 'I'll r; WUlt!):') "COMPENSATj()j\! JNSU HANn: COM M ISSIUN," "COM i\'IISSlON," "STAT I'; I NSUHA ~CI'; MAN A (; I'; i{" II N I ) ,. ~1 A N A(;[o;H" WI-I EIU; N ECI';SSA H. Y
A:--;II PHO!'I';\{.

II /~'Ii(/('Ied 11"lhl' LC'llhi/ulllrc' 0/ lite .....'1(1/1' of It/oho:
81';(:'1'1 uN 1. TIl:ll 0ct:l.iOIl 4:l- I iO I, I daho Code A Il11Ut.a ll'd,
be, :ll1d I.lll' :-;;]111(;' IWI'{'hy i:-;, al1](lllIl<.'d to I'ead a:-; follow::;:

81'

'

~('1l :Jl1Y

In
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or such securi Lies, the pJ'oceeds thereQr Lu be paid over

tIn' st.ate treasure!' for said insurance fund."

C. :.!!il ';\\1

\
\

1:3. That. Section 4.;3~171;3, Idaho Code Annotated,
be, unci the same 'hereby is, amended to read as follows:
"Section 4:3-171:3.

CLASSIFICATlON Of'

HJ::.iJ\:)

AND

AD.J1JST-

Employments insured in the state insU1'anee fund shall be divided by the * * * COl}l.lIlistfion for the
purpose of said fund, into classes. Separate accounts shall
be l\ept of the amounts collected and expended in respect to
each such class fol' convenience in determining equitable rates;
but for the purpose of paying compensation the state insurance
fund shall be deemed one and indivisible. The * * * CO?n'IIIiil~ill'l/ shall have power to rearrange any of the classes by
withdrawing any employment embraced in it and transferring
it wholly or in part to any other class, and fro111 such employments to set up new c1asses in its discretion. The * commission shall determine the hazards of the different classes
and fix the rates of premiums therefor based upon the total
pay roll and number of employees in each of such classes of
employment at the lowest possible rate consistent with the
mall1tenance of a solvent state insurance fund and the creation of a reasonable surplus and reserve; but for such purpose
and in so fixing such rates of premium, such rates shall be
fixed with due regard to the physical hazards of each industry,
occupation, or employment, and, within each class, so far as
practieable, in ace.ordance with the elements of bodily risk
or safety or other hazard of the plant or premises or wOl'k of
each insured and the manner in which the same is conducted,
together.with a reasonable regard for the accident experience
and histQl"Y of each such insured, and with due r.egard to the
accessibi1ity of medical and hospital facnities. The maximum
amount at wages 01' salary paid to an individual employee on
which premium shall be collected by the state insurance fund
shall be $2400 per annum."
SECTION 14. That Section 43-1714, idaho
b~, a11d the same hereby is, amended to read

Code Annotated,
as follows:

"Section 43-1714. ACCOUNTS. The * * * cO'lrl.'missiOl/,
shall keep an account of the money l)aid in premiums by each
of the seveml classes of em,pJoynwnts, and the expense of
administering the st.ate insurance fund and the disbursements
on ae(:()unt of injuries and deaths of employees in each of
said classes, including the setting up of reserves adequate. to
meet anticipated and unexpected losses und to carl'Y the claims
to l1wlurity; and also an account of the money received from
each illdividual employer; and or tl1l' amount disbursed 1'1'0111
the :;1:'lle il1:'iUrnl1C'l' fund for eXj>l;l1SeS, and on :Jceount or

\

\
\

\

thereof."

\
\
.

:
,
>

t,:!:',

injuries \lnd deuth or t\w emllloyecs or such L'mployC'r, tl1duding the \,\;$('I'V(;'8 so set up,"
.
.-- Sr~C'\'Iu}.; 15. That Section 4:3~17H), idaho Code Al1n()t~lt.ed,
be, and the same hereby is, ~llnended to 1'e:.1(\ as follow:):
"Section 43-1715 .. DIVIDENDS. At the end of \~\'e\'y yt',ll',
and at s\.1t:h other tlme:;, as the '" * ; ' CI),II/.'I/Iil{sio,l ill its
discretion may determine) a read,justment of the rate shall
be made for each or the several classes of empl()yr)')\:)n\.~ or
industries. 1f at any time there is an aggregate balance
remaining to the eredit Ol any c1as.s of employment or industry
which the "' .. '" ("lJm.Jn1·ssion deems may be ~arely and
prope.rly divided, it lTlay in its discretion, credit tu 12adl individual member of such class who shall have been a subscriber
to the state insunl11ce fund for a period of six months or
more, prior to the ti1118 of such readjustment, such provorLion
of such balance as he is properly entitled to, having regard to
his prior V
premiums since the last readjustment~ of j:ates."
aid
ECTlON 16. That Section 43-1716, Idaho Code Annotated,
be, and the same hereby is, amended to read as follows:
"Section 43-1716. ASSESSMENTS. If the premiums fixed for
any class and collected fronl. its members are sUf)sequently
found bv the * * '" commiss'io71- to have been too small
for any "period, it may determine what additional premiums
are required from said class 1'01' such period, and moy make
assessments accordingly, and each of the members clf such
class shall be liable to the said '" ('u1nm-ission to l)ay such
assessment so made upon him within :30 days arter notice

81':CTIO;-';

Ml:'}:T Ol~ PREMH;MS.
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SECTlON 1'7. That Section 43-1717, Idaho Code Annotated,
be, and the same hereby is, amended to re.ad as follows:
"Section 43-1717. RBADJUS'l'MENT OP PAYROLLS. If the
amount of vremium collected from any employer Flt the beginning of any period is ascert~ljned by using the ~e5til11ated
expenditure of wages I'DI' the veriod of time covered by such
premium payment as ct basis, an adjustment of the amount
of such premium shall be made at the end of such period alld
the actual amount of such premium shall be determined in
accordan
with the amount of the actual expenditure of
wages roreesuch periQcI; and if such wag:e, expenditure for such
pel:iod i:'i less than the amount on which such e::,timated pre.J11iU111 was collected, such employer shall be entItled to l'ecelVe
a refund 1'1'0111 the stnte insurance fund of the difTerence between Lhe ::lll1ount ",0 pHid hy hi111 and the amount so found
to be ;H:tuully due, or t.o \1ave t.he amount of such dil-ference
n
on
jlnl l11iul11
at his npl.in ; :tnd
if such :t(:\ ual prell1illlll, wl1l'n ~\) a~e(,l'l.ail1l'd, !.>:\I·\:,(!t!i-\ il1

crediLL~d

succt\edin~

paYll1E'nl~

111.0\ 110
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CHAPTEH ID

CHAPTER 20

(ll. B. NO. 32)

(11. D. NO, Hi)

AN ACT

AN ACT

Ml!~?\UIN\.;

SECTIOl'-: (j!,-!!\)oG lUAHO CODE ANNOTATE I I HELATJ:-.iG TO TltAVEL EXPENSE OF STATE OFFICERS
ANU El\-lPLOYEI~S, PHOVlJlING AMOUNT FOn THAVEL
8XPENSE, ANII ltEQLiIHING l-'nIOH AUTHOmZATION FOH
THAVEL OUTSIDE: TBI::: STATE OF' IDAHO, BY PHOVIDING THAT ONLY THE JUSTICES OF 'l'HE SUPHEME
COllnT AND GOVEltNOn SHALL RECEIVE THEW ACTUAL ANll NECESSARY TllAVEL EXPENSE \vHE~ TTIAVELll"G OUTSlTlE THE STATE OF IDAHO.

'e II: J~'n<lctetl /)1/ the Legl:sl<du're o[ the Sta,te of hh.lho:
SECTION 1. That Section 65-2006 be and the same is
erehy amended to read as follows:

65-2006 ..... TRAVEL EXPENSES - LIMITATION ON
AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED-EX:EPTIONS.-The state board of examiners shall Ilut allow
ny claim, or appn'IVe any vOl1cher, 1'01' the expenst:'s of any
mel'.!' OJ' employee of the stat.e, while traveling on the busi·
.ess of the state, as provided for ill section 65-2005, which
hall, exc'lusive of l'aill'oad, stage fare, alld supplic::l, be in
xcess of five dollars pel' day, when travel j~ but\\'ecil two
loints within the state and five dollal's pel' day when the
ravel is to and from points outsir1<! the state.
lMOUNT~FRIOJ:1

No claim for such expense shall be allowed 01' poid where
,nch expense i.s incllrred while tra\'eling outside o~ the State
If Id"ho, unless prior to the incurring of such eX])CllSe perni::;sion to incur the same has been obtained in writil1g' from
,he governor uf t.he state and filed with the state :1tlditol',
:0 be made a maHer oj' record with the state bOHrd of exlmine1's, except \\'hl~J'e the same is necessarily illclIl'l'ed, in
:he businc::;s of t.lie ::;[nte, in di1'0ct and continuolls travel
:1'0111 olle point in till' State of Idaho to another ill ::;;!ilt state
lVe.I· the usually t.nl\·elecl rout.e: pl'ovided, that the actual
lI1d necessary e.xpl:~lJSe!;; of the j1l8tiees of the SUIJI'eme Court
wel. t.he governor, '" * * when tl'nv£~ling to Hnd 1'1'0111 points
)l1b:;ide (if the state, ::;halJ be allo\\'cd find paid.
AjljlJ'OVCc! Febrll;lJ'.\'

rJ. 19t1J.

:\7

IllAII\) :-il·:S~I(]~ J.A \\'5

'~I

lti'lj

AI\'JENllIl\G SECTIONS 4:1-17IH, ,1:·)-17():!. 4::1-1,0:3, ~:1-17n·l. ·13170" OF THE: IDAHO CODE }.NNOTA'I'EU; AJ)])INC A
NI::\\' ~I,:I:TION TO BE KNO\VX .-\8 SECTION 'l::170fi
OF 'I'll E lUAHO COl! I:: ANNOT.-\TEII; AMENDING ;:;1-:CTIONS -]:3-170" 48-170\), 4:)-1,11, .j~j·l'J.2, 4:3-1713, 4:.~·]7l4,
~:3-171ij, ~:~-l71G, 43·171" -13·1718, 4:5-17J.\), 43-17Z\!, 4:3-1'7::1,
4:H7:2:;, 4:-1-1728, ~:H,2li, 4:1-1':.!(i AND 43-1S1G OF THE
lDABO CODE ANN01'ATED, HELATlNG TO THE ST ..WE
INS1)lTANCE FUNil; ABOLlSHll"G THE COi\1PE:-~SA
TION lNSUJ1ANCE C0l\1l\l1SS10N AND CllE!ATlNG THE
OPFleS OF STATE INSUHANCE MANAGE!H. TO AJ)lVlIN1STEJ1 THE STATE; INSUHANCE FUND i l'HO\TDINC; Fon THE APPOINTi\IENT OF A STATE INSUHM":CE
MAN ..\GEH AND FIXING HIS S.-'l.LAIlY AND HIS Tim:).! OF
OFFICI::: AND FOR FIXING THE Al\10UNT 01" HIS BOND,
ANn PHESCTI.UHNG HlS DUTIES, LIADlLlTIES, AND
POWEHSj PROV1DING FOR THE l\1ETHOD OF l\1.-\KING
PAYl\lEN'l'S OF WORKMEN'S CO!'l1PENSATION LOSSES
AND l'HEMIUM HE1'UHNS; PIWVIDlNG FOn. THE INVESTlI\ENT OF SUTIPLUS on HESEnVE OF THE STATE
INSUl1ANCE FUND 1'0 BE MAnE BY TH}(; DEPAHT:vlEN'f

OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT AT TIU; mRECTION OF THE
STATE INSUTIANCE lVlANAGETI.; 1'1l0VIDlNG FOH TlIE
CANCELLATION OF ANY POLlCY OF WORKMEN'S COM-

PENSATION INSllHANCE UNIIEIl CONDITIONS WIJEIlE
Ei\1PLOYEIl IS IN nEFAULT, AND SUBSTlTUTlNG
THE wonDS "STATE INSUHANCE! l\1ANAGEH" AND
"MANAGER" FOil THE WOHns "COMPENSATION lNSURANCB COMMISSlON" OTI "GOMMISSlON" WHERE NECESSAHY AND PTIOPEll, ANn DECLARING AN El\1EHGENCY.

nm

Be It

["'II,((cte(Z llY

the Lc.!risla.tm"e of tho Stc/.te of Idaho:

SECT)()N 1.
Thnt Seeiion 4;1-1701, Idaho COd0 Annotated. as lIlncnc1ed by Chapter 251, SL!ssion Laws of ) \);19, be,
and the same if> hereby mmmded t.o rend as follows:

"Section 43-1701. CRE:A,TION OF' STATE INSUHANCE
;1:-\ t.he
state il1surance fund, foJ' the PlIl'POSl' of illRllring employers
against liability fo)' C011l11l'l1:';ntion \Imler this wOl'l';Jllen's
compcns n1..inn law * * * (/'/11/, i;111l (JI:C"1t'JJ(),I:i(JllaLcli,~('(/,"" eOIll1'1(:II,~(fti0/1 1((:1/ 1 and of s('clIj'illJ.( to th(~ persons entitled there-

F1JNn. There if; he)'(~h.\' ('\'C:'atcd n fund, to be ]\11o\\,n

,I::!
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011.

accolJlli

(I~' jJljl1~'jC$

C. 20 ''.II

and deaths of employees in eHch of

sa1l1 classes, JJ1cludlllg the setting llIJ of reserves adeqllate
to nlt.!d <1ntil.:ipated and 1I11GXpected lossex nlld to carrv the
dniml> to maiLlJ:iiy; and also 011 Hccoun1, of the mOllev l'ec.eivecl from each individual employer; and of the anlollnt
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disbursed from the state insurance fund fol.' expenses, and
Oil accollllt of injuries and disablement and death of the
elllplo~'ees of such employel', including the rcserve::; S,) set
\1 p."
SEC. 13.

That Section 43-1715, Idaho Code Annotated,

as amended by Chapter 251, Idaho Session Lmvs of 1939,

be, .and the same hereby is, amended to read as follows:
"Secti911 43-1715. DIVIDENDS. At the end of every
* * * J1Janayer in hi.s
discretion m~ly determine, a l'eadjustment of the rate sha!1
be made for each of the several classes of employments or
indllstries. If at any time there is an aggregate balance
remaining to the credit of any class of employment or in~
dustry which the'" * * MCLll.Q,ge1" deems ma:)' be safely and
proljerl~r divided, he may in his discretion, credit to each
indjvidual member of such class who shall have been a sub~
scriber to the state insurance fund for a period of six
months or more, prior to the time of suell readjustment,
sl1ch proportion of such balance as he is propcrly entitled
to, having regard to his prior paid premiums since the ];.'1st
readjustment of rates." .
---m;c, 14. That Section 43-·1716, Idaho Code Annotated,
as amended by Chapt.er 251, Idaho Session Laws of 1939,
be, and the same hereby is, amended to read as follows:
yecU', and at such other times as the

Hi"Section 4::1-] 7H>' ASSESSMENcrs. If the pl'e1l1iuJlls
fixed for any cla13s and collected from its members are subsequently found by the * * '" M(~na.ge1· to have been too small
for any periqd, he may determine what additional premiums
<11'e required from said clas~; '1'01' stich period, and may lllHI,e
8sscssments accordingly, and each of the 111embe1'R of Slleh
el<lss shall be liable to the said * * * 1i1(l.'!1.({,{Jel' to p~ly slleh
H:-;:;;(!::\SJl1cn t so made lIpon h irn with i n 30 dnys after notice
thel'·eof."
SEC, 15. That Section 43··1717, Idaho Cucle Annotated,
as amended by Chapter 251, Idaho Session Laws of 1!)J9,
be, and the same hereby is, amended to read as follows:
"Section 4::1-1717. READJUSTMENT OF PAYROLLS.
If the amollnt of premium collected from nny employer at
the beginning of nllY period is ascertained by using- the es1.i-
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I1lntecl expellditlll'e of 'wages fo1' the period of time l:o\·cJ'(.'d
bv suc.h premium paymcllt H'::> H basis, and ndjLlstll1cnt of
tile amount of slIc.h pl.'emiul11 shall be l11ade at the elld of
such period and the actual amount of such Pl't!!)1iU111 shall
be determined in accordance with the amollnt. of the nctllal
expenditure of \yages fo], such period; aWl if slIl:h wage
expenditure for sl1ch period is less than the amount of
which slIch estimated pl't:!l11iuJll was collectc1rI. ~lIch employer
sh,)11 be entitled to receive a l'efund from the state insul"l1n<:.e fund of the dii-Yel'ence between the amolilit so paid by
him and the amount so found to be actually ellie, or to have
the nmount of such difference credited 011 slicceeding premium payments at his option; and if sueh actual premium,
when so ascertained . exceeds ill amollnt a premiu1ll so paid
by such employer at the beginning; of such ]h)I"iod, stich
employer shall immediately upon being advised of the true
amount of such premium cllle forthwith pay to the'" * >I<
i11an(~ge1· an amount equal to the difference between the
amount actually found to be clue and the amount paid by
him at the beginning of such period, for deposit in the state
insllrance fund.'!
SEC, 16. That Section 43-1718, Idaho Code Annotated,
as amended by Chapter 251, Idaho Session Laws of 1939,
be, and the same hereby is, amended to read as follows:
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"Section 43'-1718. POLICIES AND PAYMENT OF
PHEMIUMS. 1. Every employer insuring in the state inSl11'ance fund shall receive fl'om the * * * il!O.il<l.f]t'·I' n COI)tract or poliey of insurance.
"2. Except as otherwise provided in this chapt!?1:'. nil
pl'emiums shall be paid by evcry employer who elects to
insllre with the state insl1r~'tllce fund to the * * * lII(('l'I(f.,r;eI'
::;e11li-annually, 01' at sLich times as may be pl'escribed by
the * :I< '" lIIcm.(/.qe;/'. Receipts shall be given 1'01' such payments and the money shall be paid ove1' to the state tl'('[\SUl'er to the credit' of the state insurance fund."
SEC. 17. That Scdion 4:':-J7]9, Idaho C()!I(~ Allnotn\l.'d,
am(?nded by ChaptcL' 2Gl, Idaho Session L;1W~; of l!);'l!J,
be, and the same hereby is, nmended to l'end as follo\\'s:

[IS

"Section 4:1-17] 9. ACTIONS FOR COLLECTION J?\7
CASE OF DEFA UL1'. PENALTY. CANCELLATJ'ON OF'
POLICY. If nn employer shall defnult ill anr Il<I,Vlllellt ]'(~
fjllin~d to be made lJy him to the state illslIJ':ll1ee fllnd, (IF'
amount due fJ'om him shnll iH! collectec1 by civil ndioll
ng'ail1st him ill t1H~ namG of till! * * '" M(W(!.{/I'/', alld it sh:1I1
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AN ACT
RELATING TO THE STATE INSURANCE FUND; TO PROVIDE LEGISLATIVE INTENT;
REPEALING SECTION 72-915, IDAHO CODE, RELATING TO DIVIDENDS;
DECLARING AN EMERGENCY AND PROVIDING A RETROACTIVE EFFECTIVE
DATE.
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Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:

7
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SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. (1) Historically, the State Insurance Fund has
exercised its discretion, pursuant to Section 72-915, Idaho Code, to determine the annual
amount of dividend, if any, a policyholder would receive.
(2) On March 5, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court filed its opinion in Farber v. Idaho
State Insurance Fund, S. Ct. 35144, in which it interpreted Section 72-915, Idaho Code, and
ruled that the State Insurance Fund cannot exercise its discretion in determining how much of
a dividend to pay to each policyholder because the statute requires a pro rata distribution of
dividends to all policyholders. The result of the decision is to require that the State Insurance
Fund pay dividends on policies that are not financially profitable, thereby restricting the fund's
ability to reduce premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders.
(3) In its decision, the Supreme Court stated that, if it has become prudent to alter the
statutory language related to the requirements for distribution of dividends, the Legislature is
the appropriate venue for such change.
(4) It was the intent of the Legislature in passing House Bill No. 774, As Amended of
the Second Regular Session of the Fifty-fourth Idaho Legislature, effective on April 3, 1998,
that the State Insurance Fund should operate like an efficient insurance company, subject to
regulation under Title 41, Idaho Code, including the dividend provisions set forth in Chapter
28, Title 41, Idaho Code. The retroactive repeal of Section 72-915, Idaho Code, to January
1, 2003, will conform with that intent. Section 73-101, Idaho Code, pennits such retroactive
repeal as long as it is "expressly so declared" in legislation.
(5) The retroactive repeal of Section 72-915, Idaho Code, will reconcile conflicts in the
existing laws governing the State Insurance Fund and will allow the fund, like other insurance
companies, to issue dividends pursuant to Chapter 28, Title 41, Idaho Code.
(6) It is the intent of the Legislature that the provisions of this act shall not apply to
any action filed in a state or federal court of law in the state of Idaho on or before December
31, 2008, and the provisions of this act shall not apply to the aforementioned case of Farber
v. Idaho State Insurance Fund as currently pending with respect to those policy holders paying
annual premiums of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500).
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SECTION 2. That Section 72-915, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby repealed.
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SECTION 3. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby declared to
exist, Section 1 of this act shall be in full force and effect on and after passage and approval,
and Section 2 of this act shall be in full force and effect retroactively to January 1,2003.
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